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OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEMISE OF 
NEPA 
Matthew A. Kameron* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)I was enacted by 
Congress in 1969. As witnessed by its wording and the debates prior 
to the Act's passage, NEPA was conceived as a strong statement by 
the government in support of environmental protection. As Senator 
Henry Jackson stated: 
[NEPA is a] declaration that we do not intend, as a government or as 
a people, to initiate actions which endanger the continued existence or 
the health of mankind.: that we will not intentionally initiate actions 
which will do irreparable damage to the air, land, and water which 
support life on earth.2 
To effectuate this optimistic goal, NEP A requires that all federal 
agencies prepare and consider an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) prior to taking action on any major program significantly 
affecting the "quality of the human environment."3 The EIS must 
contain a detailed discussion of such factors as the environmental 
impact of, the reasonable alternatives to, and the economic costs 
and benefits of the proposed action" The EIS requirement ensures 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). See also: Duetsch, The National Environmental Policy 
Act's First Five Years, 4 ENV. AFr. 3 (1975). 
• 115 CONGo REc. S.17452 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). 
• The EIS must be detailed and contain a discussion of: 
1) the environmental impact of the proposed action; 
2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented; 
3) alternatives to the proposed action; 
4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and 
83 
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that a federal agency will not undertake a major project without 
first considering its environmental consequences. 
Despite the noble goals of NEPA, the stark economic realities of 
America's energy needs, brought into focus by the Arab oil embargo, 
have resulted in a legislative and judicial response to NEP A that 
has severely weakened its intended effect. The most important leg-
islative blow came when Congress exempted the huge Alaska pipe-
line project from NEPA scrutiny through the trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act.5 Congress has also acted to derogate NEPA in 
the area of nuclear power; in 1972 it amended the Atomic Energy 
Act6 to allow plant operators to petition for temporary operating 
licenses for nuclear power plants prior to full NEPA compliance.7 In 
both of these instances, the legislative history shows that Congress 
was reacting to the use of NEPA by environmentalist groups to stall 
important energy projects.s 
Due to the inherent limitations on the powers of the judiciary, the 
courts have generally been less threatening to the intended goals of 
NEPA. In interpreting the Act the courts are limited to the wording 
of the statute and may not, at least explicitly, take cognizance of 
the problems brought on by the energy crisis in reaching a decision. 
Nevertheless, the courts are capable of derogating NEPA as wit-
nessed by the recent case of County of Suffolk u. Secretary of the 
Interior.9 The Second Circuit, in holding that an EIS prepared for 
an offshore oil and gas development program satisfied NEPA, uti-
lized an approach which may allow most, if not all, offshore oil and 
gas projects to circumvent NEPA standards. Although the court 
reasoned on statutory and precedential grounds, an undercurrent of 
5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved 
in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). 
• 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). The Act in relevant part provides: 
The actions taken pursuant to this chapter which relate to the construction and comple-
tion of the pipeline system, and to the applications filed in connection therewith necessary 
to the pipeline's operation ... shall be taken without further action under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 1652 (Supp. IV 1974). Senator Jackson, in arguing against this Act stated that 
exempting the Alaska pipeline from NEPA scrutiny would result in requests "for every project 
under the sun, for waivers, of NEPA." 119 CONGo BEe. 14,677 (daily ed. July 17, 1973). See 
also Howard, The Energy Crisis and Its Impact Upon Environmental Law, 23 N.Y.L.F. 711 
(1975). 
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1970). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 2242 (Supp. II 1972). 
• See (1973) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2417; (1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2351. 
, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
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judicial recognition of the energy crisis is implicit in the court's 
decision. 
The Second Circuit approach is based on two concepts: first, that 
an offshore oil project is easily divisible into component segments 
of exploration, production, and transportation; 10 and second, that 
the Secretary of the Interior retains statutory control over the pro-
ject's operation. 1I Under this approach, to be referred to as 
"Divisibility," only those environmental issues directly related to 
the first stage, exploration, have to be dealt with in detail in the 
initial EISY Environmental impact information on the production 
and transportation stages is, to a large extent, deferred until those 
stages are timely.13 Since the basic premise behind the detailed EIS 
requirement is to give those in a decision-making capacity enough 
information to make a well-reasoned decision based on considera-
tion of all the environmental pros and cons of an entire project, 14 the 
Second Circuit's approach arguably undermines the effectiveness of 
an EIS. Moreover, the Second Circuit justifies its approach by over-
stating the degree of control the Secretary retains and by disregard-
ing precedent on the subject of whether deferral is proper. 
This article will analyze the significance of the new approach to 
EIS evaluation set out in County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the 
Interior. 15 First, the history of the case will be presented. Next, the 
Second Circuit's Divisibility approach will be examined in light of 
NEPA precedent. Finally, the potential application of Divisibility 
to other federal energy projects will be discussed. 
ll. THE SUFFOLK COUNTY CASE 
A. Initial Developments 
The Suffolk County controversy began when, in response to a 
presidential message to Congress requesting acceleration of leasing 
to private industry of the federally-owned Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS) for oil and gas development,.6 the Secretary of the Interior 
.. 562 F.2d 1368, 1377 (2d Cir. 1977). 
" [d. 
12 [d. 
13 [d. 
" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
" 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
" President's Message to the Congress on the Energy Crisis (January 23, 1974), 10 WEEKLY 
COMPo OF PRES. Doc. 4, 72, 78 (January 28, 1974). 
"Project Independence" was the name Richard Nixon gave to a major national effort to 
achieve self-sufficiency in energy. The ultimate aim of the project ~as to achieve independ-
ence from any significant reliance upon insecure foreign energy supplies by 1980. The Project 
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designated an area off the New Jersey-Delaware-Maryland coasts 
for consideration. 17 After preliminary geological and environmental 
studies and after consultation with private industry and state and 
local governments, 154 tracts located off the New Jersey coast (the 
Sale 40 area) were chosen for final lease bidding contemplation. 1M 
The Secretary approved the project after studying the environmen-
tal impact statement (the Sale 40 EIS).19 
Within a few days after the Secretary's decision, Suffolk and Nas-
sau Counties in New York brought suit to enjoin the lease-bidding 
on the ground of EIS insufficiency.20 On August 13, 1976, Judge 
Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York granted a preliminary injunction, stating that the 
Sale 40 EIS failed to detail or consider the possible impact of state 
and local land use laws on the leasing program.21 The defendants 
applied to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on August 
16, 1976 for a stay of Weinstein's order.22 The court granted a stay 
on the ground that the leasing, in and of itself, would not cause 
irreparable injury pending the outcome of the trial on the meritsY 
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice 
Marshall, refused to vacate the stay,24 holding that the Sale 40 
leases could always be voided in the event NEPA violations were 
ultimately found. 25 The Secretary proceeded to lease the Sale 40 
tracts, accepting bids from various oil companies on 93 out of 154 
entailed three essential tasks: first, a rapid increase in energy supplies through a maximiza-
tion of production of oil, gas, coal, and shale reserves or wells or through acceleration of the 
introduction of nuclear power; second, the conservation of energy through elimination of non-
essential energy use; and third, the development of new technologies through new energy 
research and development programs. 
17 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1373 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
" 562 F.2d 1368, 1373 (2d Cir. 1977). 
11 Id . 
.. Subsequently, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the State of New York, and a 
number of Long Island counties and towns joined in the action. The State of New York later 
withdrew. 562 F.2d 1368, 1373 (2d Cir. 1977). 
21 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1374 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
Judge Weinstein's order granting the preliminary injunction was not reported. Conse-
quently, the information concerning the order was taken from the Second Circuit's decision. 
22 Id. Following the stay of the injunction, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Weinstein's 
order granting the injunction on October 14, 1976. State of New York v. Kleppe, 551 F.2d 
301 (2d Cir. 1976). 
23 Id. 
" State of New York v. Kleppe, 429 U.S. 1307 (1976). 
25 Id. at 1313. 
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tracts and executing leases to those tracts. 28 The plaintiffs returned 
to the district court for a trial on the merits. 
On the basis of further testimony and documentary evidence, 
Judge Weinstein held that the requirements of NEPA had not been 
met by the Sale 40 EISY The Sale 40 EIS was found to be fatally 
deficient on the following grounds: (1) the Sale 40 EIS failed to 
project likely pipeline routes and the effects of state and local regu-
lation on pipeline placement;28 (2) the economic costs and benefits 
of the project were grossly misrepresented;29 (3) the Sale 40 EIS 
failed to discuss adequately the alternatives of either allowing the 
government to determine the oil and gas potential of the Sale 40 
area before leasing to private industry or leasing tracts other than 
those selected.30 Judge Weinstein held the leases void and enjoined 
,. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1374 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
27 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 7 ENV. L. RPTR. 20230 (1977) . 
.. Judge Weinstein relied in part on 40 CFR § 1500.8(a)(2) (1976) which clearly seems to 
require discussion of state and local law by mandating the consideration of: 
[tlhe relationship of the proposed action to land use plans, policies, and controls for the 
affected area. This requires a discussion of how the proposed action may conform or 
conflict with the objectives and specific terms of approval or proposed Federal, State, and 
local land use plans, policies and controls. . . . Where a conflict or inconsistency exists, 
the statement should descri~e the extent to which the agency has reconciled its proposed 
action with the plan, policy or control, and the reasons why the agency has decided to 
proceed notwithstanding the absence of full reconciliation. 
40 CFR § 15OO.8(a)(2) (1976). 
On the issue of pipeline projection feasibility, Judge Weinstein lent great weight to the 
testimony of a Shell Oil Company employee, Mr. Frank Brunjes, who had undertaken an 
economic feasibility study which required the projection of likely pipeline routes: 
Had the Secretary been at least as conscientious as Shell Oil in exploring specific 
pipeline locations from an environmental perspective, he certainly would have considered 
the route into the Delaware Bay and up the Delaware River to Philadelphia, which was 
studied by Mr. Brunjes and considered a feasible and likely corridor. 
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 7 ENV. L. RPI'R. 20230, 20237 (1977). 
" Judge Weinstein used data compiled by petitioner's witness, Mr. George Donkin, which 
demonstrated to the district court's satisfaction that the Secretary's data was grossly inaccur-
ate. The Second Circuit disagreed, stating that the evidence would have value only if it 
showed that the agency's research was clearly inadequate or that the agency improperly failed 
to set forth widely held opposing views. 7 ENV. L. RPI'R. 20230, 20239 (1977). In the Circuit 
Court's opinion the Donkin testimony fell far short of demonstrating either consideration. 
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1385 (2d Cir. 1977). 
It has been held in evaluating the sufficiency of a cost-benefit analysis that conflicting data 
should be presented to the appropriate agency prior to the preparation of a final EIS. See 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 241 (W.D. Mo.1973). 
Because the issue of cost-benefit analysis is not germane to the issue of Divisibility it will 
not be discussed further in this article . 
.. Judge Weinstein found the Sale 40 EIS discussion of alternatives woefully inadequate 
in light of the requirements set forth in the Federal Register: 
A rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of alternative actions that might avoid 
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the parties from exercising any rights granted by them.3! 
B. The Second Circuit Opinion--Divisibility 
On appeal, the Second Circuit used the conventional "rule of 
reason" standard of review to evaluate the Sale 40 EIS. This stan-
dard looks at "whether the EIS was completed with in (sic) objec-
tive good faith and whether the resulting statement would permit a 
decision maker to fully consider and balance the environmental 
factors. "32 The Second Circuit found the Sale 40 EIS adequate and 
reversed the lower court.33 The significance of the Second Circuit's 
opinion lies not in the court's use of the lenient "rule of reason" 
standard, but rather in the court's articulation of Divisibility as part 
of this standard. The court utilized this unique approach in address-
ing the issues of whether the Sale 40 EIS should have projected 
likely pipeline routes34 and whether it adequately considered the 
effects of state and local regulation on the transportation of the oil 
and gas to be extracted.35 
The Second Circuit based its Divisibility theory on two premises. 
First, the Sale 40 program is an easily divisible, multistage project.3S 
The initial stage, exploration, is followed by the later stages of pro-
duction and transportation. Second, there is continuing governmen-
tal control over the program. This control is based primarily on 
language in the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (OCSLA)37 under 
which the Secretary retains the power to stipulate operating proce-
some or all of the adverse effects is essential. Sufficient analysis of such alternatives and 
their costs and impact on the environment should accompany the proposed action through 
the agency review process in order not to foreclose prematurely options which might have 
less detrimental effects. 
36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725 (1971), cited in, County of Suffolk v_ Secretary of the Interior, 7 ENV. 
L. RPrR_ 20230, 20242 (1977). In enforcing the alternative discussion requirement the courts 
have been very inconsistent. This is because the number of available alternatives is usually 
great, and to relieve the EIS drafters of an impossible burden, the courts have only required 
discussion of "reasonable" alternatives. This by necessity involves a large amount of value 
judgments. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v_ Calloway, 524 F.2d 79,93 
(2d Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). 
As with the issue of cost-benefit analysis, the issue of alternatives is not relevant to Divisi-
bility and will not be mentioned further. 
31 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 7 ENVIR. L. RPTR. 20230, 20247 (1977) . 
• 2 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir_ 1975). 
'" County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978) . 
.. 562 F.2d 1368, 1375-82 (2d Cir. 1977) . 
.. [d . 
.. [d. at 1377. 
" 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1970). 
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dures and to require environmental safeguards during the course of 
all OCS projects.3S In summarizing Divisibility, the court stated: 
[W]here a multi-stage project can be modified or changed in the future 
to minimize or eliminate environmental hazards disclosed as the result 
of information that will not become available until the future, and the 
Government reserves the power to make such a modification or change 
after the information is available and incorporated in a further EIS, it 
cannot be said that deferment violates the "rule of reason." Indeed, in 
considering a project of such flexibility, it might be both unwise and 
unfair not to postpone the decision regarding the next stage until more 
accurate data is at hand. 3D 
The substantive result of the Divisibility concept was utilization 
of a two-part test to determine adequacy of the Sale 40 EIS regard-
ing pipeline placement and the effect of state and local law on that 
placement.4o The court considered: 
1) whether obtaining more information on production and 
transportation at the initial stage of exploration was "mean-
ingfully possible";41 and 
2) whether such information would be "important" in de-
termining whether to proceed with the project.42 
Applying this two-p~rt test to the Sale 40 EIS's discussion of 
pipeline placement, the Second Circuit found that more detailed 
information would be of no practical use to the Secretary since it 
would be the result of pure speculation.43 The court stated that 
although pipeline placement projection has value for economic fea-
sibility purposes, it "would be virtually useless speculation for envi-
ronmental impact purposes."44 Moreover, it found that pipeline 
3M The relevant portion of the Act reads: 
The Secretary may at any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations . 
and, notwithstanding any other provisions herein, such rules and regulations shall apply 
to all operations conducted under a lease issued or maintained under the provisions of this 
subchapter. 
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(l) (1970). 
31 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1378 (2d Cir. 1977) . 
•• [d. 
" [d . 
.. [d. 
" [d. at 1379. 
II [d. at 1380. In response to the testimony of Frank Brunjes, which concerned a pipeline 
feasibility study done for Shell Oil, see note 27, supra, the Second Circuit stated: 
Judge Weinstein's reliance on the testimony of Franklin Brunjes and the pipeline feasi-
bility study made by him for Shell Oil Company, moreover, is misplaced. That study did 
not purport to project probable or "likely" pipeline routes. It merely hypothesized some 
lines from arbitrarily-selected points in the ocean to similar points on shore, in order to 
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route projection was not essential to an environmental assessment 
of this stage of the project because "[the Secretary's] decision does 
not preclude him from requiring in the future that pipeline routes 
be modified or altered or from imposing additional conditions and 
safeguards on pipelining that will in effect permit its use only if it 
is environmentally acceptable."45 In addressing whether the Sale 40 
EIS adequately discussed the impact of state and local regulation 
on the transportation of the oil and gas, the court found that since 
the projection of pipeline routes was not necessary at this stage, 
since neither was a discussion of the laws which would regulate such 
pipelines.46 The court stated further that the states and municipali-
ties affected could change their regulations between the time of the 
publication of the EIS and the date, possibly three years or more 
later, when application would have to be made to local authorities 
for land use authorizationsY 
ITI. A CRITIQUE OF DIVISIBILITY 
The significance of the Second Circuit's Divisibility approach in 
EIS sufficiency cases extends beyond the facts of Suffolk County.4R 
Offshore oil and gas are likely to become two of America's primary 
energy sources, and as a result it can be presumed that litigation in 
this area will increase.49 Because other courts in other fact situations 
may utilize the Second Circuit's approach, it is necessary to closely 
examine the Divisibility concept. 
show that pipelines could be used economically over long and circuitous routes. It demon-
strated that routes might be shifted as much as a dozen miles north or south without 
substantially altering the cost of pipelining oil to shore. As Brunjes conceded, in order to 
make his analysis he was forced to assume not only that oil would be discovered but such 
basic facts as the location of the discovery, the "timing, quantity, quality, destination, 
what the cost for various routes and modes of transportation are." He further agreed that 
changes could occur in some or all of these key variables which would materially change 
his estimates .... In fact, Mr. Brunjes himself testified that it was "very premature at 
this time to speculate as to exact routing involved." 
[d. at 1379 . 
.. [d. at 1380 . 
•• [d. at 1378. 
11 [d. at 1379. 
1M County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
The Divisibility concept first begin to crystalize in Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 
827 (5th Cir. 1975) where the court held that the Secretary's right to monitor a multi-stage 
project was a factor to consider in weighing the sufficiency of an EIS. However, the Fifth 
Circuit did not expand the concept or apply it in the broad manner that the Second Circuit 
has. 
II See Taylor, NEPA Pre-emption Legislation: Decisionmaking Alternatives for Crucial 
Federal Projects, 6 ENv. AFF. 373 (1978). 
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A. Control 
The Second Circuit relied on the language of OCSLN° and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Inte-
riorSI to establish the control necessary for Divisibility. First, the 
court noted that under OCSLA the Secretary has the power to pre-
scribe "rules and regulations as may be necessary"52 to protect the 
environment from hazards posed by exploration of continental shelf 
resources. All OCS oil and gas development leases, including the 
Sale 40 leases, provide that the lessees must, in their operations, 
comply with the regulations as they may be revised or supple-
mented. 53 However, because the leases are considered vested prop-
erty interests by the courts,54 it has been held that the Secretary 
may only void a lease if it violates pre-existing rules and regula-
tions. 55 Since environmental problems may arise after the leases are 
.. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1970). The relevant portions of OCSLA read: 
[d. 
The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this subchapter relating to the leasing of 
the outer Continental Shelf, and shall prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out such provisions. The Secretary may at any time prescribe and 
amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary and proper in order to 
provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer 
Continental Shelf, and the protection of correlative rights therein, and, notwithstanding 
any other provisions herein, such rules and regulations shall apply to all operations con-
ducted under a lease issued or maintained under the provisions of this subchapter. 
OCSLA further provides: 
The issuance and continuance in effect of any lease, or of any extension, renewal, or 
replacement of any lease under the provisions of this subchapter shall be conditioned upon 
compliance with the regulations issued under this subchapter and in force and effect on 
the date of the issuance of the lease. 
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2) (1970). 
" 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (1976). The relevant portions include: 
Emergency suspensions. The supervisor is authorized, either in writing or orally with 
written confirmation, to suspend any operation, including production, which in his judg-
ment threatens immediate, serious, or irreparable harm or damage to life, including 
aquatic life, to property, to the leased deposits, to other valuable mineral deposits or to 
the environment. Such emergency suspension shall continue until in his judgment the 
threat or danger has terminated. 
30 C.F.R. § 250.12(c) (1970). 
The supervisor is authorized by written notice to the lessee to suspend any operation, 
including production, for failure to comply with applicable law, the lease terms, the 
regulations in this part, OCS orders, or any other written order or rule including orders 
for filing of reports and well records or logs within the time specified. 
30 C.F.R. § 250.12(d)(3) (1970). 
" 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1970). 
" County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1381 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978) . 
.. Union Oil Company of California v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1975). 
55 [d. 
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executed and before rules covering such problems are promulgated, 
any reliance on the Secretary's ability to void the leases is overem-
phasized. Accordingly, the Second Circuit did note that willful vio-
lations of subsequently enacted rules could result in injunctive re-
lief.58 However, although leases can be temporarily suspended for 
such violations, the suspension can last only as long as necessary to 
give Congress a chance to take action on whether to void the leaseY 
If Congress fails to act within a reasonable time the suspension must 
be lifted. 58 Again, the degree of reliance placed on the statute by the 
court is unjustified. 
The Second Circuit's reliance on the Secretary of the Interior's 
regulations59 is similarly undermined. The regulations do authorize 
the Secretary to "suspend any operation, including production, 
which in his judgment threatens immediate, serious or irrepara-
ble"80 injury to the environment until "in his judgment the threat 
or danger has terminated."81 However, subsequent judicial enforce-
ment has limited the length of time the suspension may last. The 
Ninth Circuit82 has held that such regulatory suspensions, like sta-
tutory suspensions, cannot be indefinite, and may last only so long 
as necessary to permit Congress to consider termination ofthe leases 
for environmental reasons. Under this rule the Secretary's power is 
not to void but merely to suspend the leases for a reasonable period. 
Final voidance can only come, therefore, through Congress. 
The Secretary of the Interior does retain some control over the 
progress of an OCS energy development project. He does not, how-
ever, retain the degree of control implicit in the Second Circuit's 
reasoning. The actual control over such a project clearly lies with 
Congress. Two factors must be considered in determining whether 
Congress will exercise its power to void OCS leases. First, Congress 
has refused to take such action in the past,83 and its actions with 
respect to the trans-Alaska pipeline connote a clear preference for 
energy production over environmental concerns.84 Second, because 
.. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1381 (2d Cir. 1977). 
" See note 50, supra. It appears that injunctive relief is appropriate only when the lease 
violates pre·existing rules and regulations. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2) (1970). This interpretation 
is consistent with the "vested property interest" approach the courts have taken on emer-
gency suspensions. See text at note 63, infra . 
.. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 149 (9th Cir. 1973) (on petition for hearing). 
51 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (1976) . 
.. 30 C.F.R. § 25O.12(c) (1976). 
II [d. 
o Union Oil Company of California v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1975) . 
.. [d. 
0< See text and notes at note 5, supra. 
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the leases are vested property interests, the lessees must be compen-
sated. 65 Since billions of dollars are at stake, the economic conse-
quences of voiding an OCS lease would be extreme.8A Therefore, 
reliance on congressional voidance is misplaced. 
B. NEPA and the Concept of Deferral 
The Second Circuit's opinion not only overstates the govern-
ment's control over OCS projects, but also uses this overstatement 
to develop a test of EIS sufficiency which virtually ignores the re-
quirements of NEPA 67 and substantially weakens the effect NEPA 
may have on future OCS energy development projects. This result 
is accomplished by allowing an EIS to defer treatment of matters 
not of immediate concern. The test inquires whether presently 
obtaining information on these matters is "meaningfully possible"88 
and whether such information would be "important" in determin-
ing whether to proceed with the project. On the surface, that in-
quiry seems reasonable: why demand information which cannot be 
obtained and which is not important? However, by broadly defin-
ing the words "meaningfully possible" and "important" the Second 
Circuit has allowed the Sale 40 EIS to skirt issues which it is re-
quired to discuss in detail by either the applicable statutes and 
regulations or the case law. 
The court states that "if the additional information would at best 
amount to speculation as to future event or events, it obviously 
would not be of much use as input in deciding whether to proceed. "89 
The court, in effect, is holding that speculation at an early stage of 
a divisible project is not required. This conclusion, however, is not 
warranted. Although NEPA does not require "crystal ball in-
quiry, "70 an EIS must furnish information which is reasonably nec-
essary to enable those in a decision-making capacity to make a 
well-reasoned evaluation of the environmental consequences of a 
proposed project. 71 Thus, the preparation of an EIS requires specu-
lation. As the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has stated: 
•• Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963) . 
•• In this project, more than $1.1 billion was paid by the oil companies for the leases. 
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1387 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
IT See text and notes at note 28, supra . 
•• County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1378 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978) . 
.. [d. 
,. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
71 See text and notes at note 14, supra. 
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It must be remembered that the basic thrust of an agency's responsibili-
ties under NEPA is to predict the environmental effects of a proposed 
action before the action is taken and those effects fully known. Reasona-
ble forecasting and speculation is thus implicit in NEPA, and we must 
reject any attempt by agencies to shirk their responsibilities under 
NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of future environmental effects 
as "crystal ball inquiry. "72 
Moreover, under Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guide-
lines, which were promulgated to flesh out the requirements of 
NEPA and are to be accorded "great weight,"73 the EIS must specu-
late about future laws which might affect the project.74 The CEQ 
guidelines also require EIS speculation in other areas. For example, 
one CEQ guideline states that an EIS must discuss "related Federal 
actions and projects in the area, and further actions contem-
plated.' '75 
The Suffolk County 78 case itself provides a good example of the 
importance of reasonable speculation in an EIS. Although the exact 
future location of the pipelines could not have been established, 
general areas of placement could have been predicted.77 The Secre-
tary and others involved in the decision-making process could then 
have been advised of the types of environmental problems likely to 
arise with respect to each general area.78 Moreover, the Sale 40 EIS, 
by not providing an in-depth discussion of state and local law, 
glossed over the possibility that pipelines would not be allowed.79 
The result of pipeline illegality would be that tankers would have 
to be used to transport the oil and gas produced from the Sale 40 
area. This would, of course, raise a whole new series of environmen-
tal questions which the Sale 40 EIS, under the Second Circuit's 
approach, was able to avoid.80 
C. Jurisprudential Considerations 
Perhaps the greatest problem with Divisibility is that it repre-
sents an attempt by the judiciary to act in a legislative capacity. 
NEPA was enacted by Congress for the purpose of making sure that 
72 Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
73 Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1310 (1974). 
" See note 28, supra. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1976) (emphasis added). 
,. 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
17 See text and notes at note 28, supra. 
7. [d. 
TO 562 F.2d 1368, 1377 (2d Cir. 1977) . 
.. [d. 
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federal decision-makers knew the environmental consequences of 
their actions.81 To effectuate this purpose the Act contains specific 
requirements with which federal agencies must comply.82 It is the 
courts' role to enforce NEPA, not to rewrite it, and in substance 
Divisibility represents a rewriting of NEPA.83 
Congress has recognized that NEPA should be enforced by the 
courts, and that the proper body to render NEPA ineffective is 
Congress itself. This is implicit in the trans-Alaska Pipeline Author-
ization Act. 84 Had Congress wanted to repeal NEPA or alter it on a 
larger scale it would have done so . .Instead Congress specifically 
exempted one project from NEPA scrutiny. As to other projects, 
NEPA still applies. It is unquestionably in the hands of Congress 
to act in the area of offshore oil development, and if it decides that 
this development is vital to the United States and should not be 
subject to meaningingful NEPA review, then it can take the proper 
action. Rather than waiting for Congress to act, the Second Circuit 
has taken upon itself to render meaningful NEPA review of offshore 
oil projects impossible. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF Suffolk County 
Whether or not the Second Circuit's Divisibility approach will be 
utilized by other courts hearing similar cases has yet to be deter-
mined. The Supreme Court, by denying certiorari,85 has declined to 
rule on the appropriateness of Divisibility as a standard of review. 
However, because of the attractiveness of Divisibility to oil compa-
nies and the Department of the Interior, it is almost certain that 
they will contend that Divisibility is the proper standard by which 
to guage an EIS discussing offshore oil projects. The issue, therefore, 
will likely reach the courts, and because of America's continuing 
energy problems they may well follow the Second Circuit's lead 
despite the major deficiencies analyzed above. 
In other energy areas, most notably coal development and nuclear 
power, the initial question which must be answered is whether Divi-
sibility as a concept is applicable. The first point to consider is 
whether such projects possess the requisite factor of continuing gov-
., See text at note 14, supra. 
" See text and notes at notes 3 and 4, supra . 
.. This is not to say that the courts should enforce NEPA to the point of hopelessly bogging 
down important projects over inconsequential details, rather it is that the courts should rule 
within the spirit of NEPA . 
• f 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). See also text and notes at note 5, supra . 
.. 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
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ernment contro1.88 The relevant statutes and regulations indicate 
that the government retains sufficient control over mining and nu-
clear power to invoke Divisibility. 87 A determination of whether coal 
and nuclear power possess the second requisite concept of being 
easily divisible, multistage projects, however, is more difficult.88 
The stages of an offshore oil project-exploration, production, and 
transportation-are clearly delineated and pose serious separate 
environmental risks.89 In the mining and nuclear power situations 
the delineations are less distinct. For example, locating offshore oil 
and determining the feasability of going after it involves a large 
scale exploration effort. Exploration for coal is far less involved; in 
many cases the location and potential yield of coal deposits are 
clearly known. 90 With respect to nuclear power, exploration is not a 
factor.91 In addition, transportation of offshore oil to shore involves 
serious environmental risks because of the danger of pipeline leak-
age or tankers running aground. The transportation of coal by rail-
road poses almost no environmental risks. In the case of nuclear 
power the product being transported is the end product, electricity 
and, again, the environmental risks are far less apparent. In terms 
of environmental risks, production is the key stage of both coal and 
nuclear power projects. Consequently, it is the only stage which 
must be dealt with in any detail in an EIS.92 It does not appear 
likely, therefore, that mining and nuclear power possess the requi-
site concept of being easily divisible, multistage projects to allow 
courts to invoke Divisibility. 
It is quite possible, however, that the Second Circuit's approach 
will have an indirect effect on other types of energy projects for, if 
nothing else, Divisibility represents a message to other courts. Im-
plicit in Divisibility is the notion that the judiciary can prevent 
NEPA from hindering the nation's energy development. Since Con-
.. See text at note 37, supra. 
111 See Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (Supp.1I 1972); Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970) . 
.. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F. 2d 1368, 1377 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978) . 
.. Id . 
.. See McCloskey, The Energy Crisis: The Issues and a Proposed Response, 1 ENv. An. 
587 (1971). 
II Exploration in this context relates to the development of a nuclear power plant and does 
not involve the search for radioactive minerals. The exploration for such minerals is consid-
ered a separate exercise and is not treated in an EIS for the construction of a nuclear power 
plant. 
12 See generally Energy and the Law: A Symposium. 54 ORE. L. REv. 503 (1975). 
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gress is apparently taking a similar stance, other courts may very 
well devise their own schemes to circumvent NEPA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that the Second Circuit's Divisibil-
ity approach in Suffolk County D3 is unsound from several perspec-
tives. As a legal matter, the court has overstated the degree of con-
trol the Secretary maintains over an OCS project and has developed 
a two-part test which results in the erroneous conclusion that NEPA 
does not require speculation. From a jurisprudential point of view 
the court has acted in a quasi-legislative fashion, usurping an issue 
which should have clearly been left with Congress. Whether other 
courts will follow such an approach in additional OCS oil and gas 
development projects or in other energy areas, only time will tell. It 
is hoped that they will not, and will enforce NEPA according to its 
mandate, leaving any changes to be made in the hands of Congress. 
" 562 F. 2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3518 (1978). 
